Michigan Journal of International Law
Volume 17

Issue 3

1996

An Analysis of the Oslo II Agreement in Light of the Expectations
of Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas
Justus R. Weiner
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Justus R. Weiner, An Analysis of the Oslo II Agreement in Light of the Expectations of Shimon Peres and
Mahmoud Abbas, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 667 (1996).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol17/iss3/5

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal
of International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE OSLO II AGREEMENT
IN LIGHT OF THE EXPECTATIONS OF
SHIMON PERES AND MAHMOUD ABBAS
SHIMON PERES, BATTLING FOR PEACE:

A

MEMOIR.

New York: Random

House, 1995. 350 pp.
MAHMOUD ABBAS, THROUGH SECRET CHANNELS.

Reading: Garnet Pub-

lishing, Ltd., 1995. 252 pp.
Reviewed by Justus R. Weiner*
INTRODUCTION

It must be acknowledged that in the brief interval since the signing
of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on September 13, 1993, and with
the added impetus of the Rabin assassination on November 4, 1995, the
prevailing understanding of the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict
has been substantially modified. The unenviable task of reconciling
Israeli and Palestinian nationalism, understood as virtually futile, has
proceeded further than even the most optimistic peace campaigner could
have foreseen. As Rabin observed in his speech on the White House
lawn at the September 28, 1995 signing ceremony of the Oslo II interim
agreement:
Now, after a long series of formal, festive statements, take a
look at this stage: the king of Jordan, the president of Egypt,
Chairman Arafat, and us, the prime minister and foreign minister
of Israel, on one platform ....
Please take a good, hard look. The sight you see before you at
this moment was impossible, was unthinkable, just two years ago.
Only poets dreamed of it; and, to our great pain, soldiers and civilians went to their deaths to make this moment possible....
Yes, I know: our speeches are already repeating themselves.
Perhaps this picture has already become routine.'
*

Scholar in Residence, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs; Adjunct Lecturer, Ben-

Gurion University; Adjunct Lecturer, Tel Aviv University. J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law
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The support of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, and particularly its president,
Professor Daniel J. Elazar, was essential in writing this review. The author expresses his
indebtedness to Daniel Ohana for his editorial and research assistance. The assistance of
Sarah Kaufman, Omit Niv, and Aimee L. Kahan is also appreciatively acknowledged.
1. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Address on the Occasion of the Signing Ceremony of

the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 1 (Sept. 28,
1995) (transcript on file with Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw).
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Five weeks later, the profundity of the political revolution that
Rabin alluded to was, sadly, reinforced by the presence of eighty-six
heads of state and government who gathered in Jerusalem to honor him
at his funeral.2 These dignitaries included Egypt's President Hosnei
Mubarak, who had never visited Jerusalem despite having received
many official invitations during the more than fifteen years Egypt and
Israel have been at peace. Clearly, the Middle East is a vastly different
place than it was prior to the diplomatic breakthrough that generated the
Declaration of Principles and four subsequent agreements between Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and
Gaza Strip (hereinafter Oslo II) is the most recent and the final interim
agreement. It supersedes all interim agreements previously signed between the parties. Oslo II established the overall framework for the
elections, held on January 20, 1996, of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority (hereinafter Council) and the Ra'ees (hereinafter
Chairman) of the Executive Authority. The elections were preceded by
the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from most Palestinian populated
cities and towns in the West Bank. Pursuant to the Agreement, Israeli
armed forces in the West Bank will deploy further after the inauguration
of the Council. The Agreement states that the Council will supersede the
Palestinian Authority (PA) after its inauguration and provide local
governance for the Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip during the rest of the interim period. The Council is to have a
strong police force that will assume responsibility for public order and
internal security in those areas under its jurisdiction in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip.
The jurisdiction of the Council covers the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip but does not include matters that are subject to the permanent
status negotiations, namely, the status of Jerusalem, the future of the
Jewish settlements, specified Israeli military installations, the disposition
of Palestinian refugees,, borders, and foreign relations. In addition, tlhe
Council's jurisdiction does not encompass functions for which it has not
been granted authority under the Oslo II Agreement, such as defense
against external threats.
Also worthy of mention are the four interim agreements concluded
between Israel and the PLO prior to the Oslo II Agreement. The first

2. United States Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, Address at Haifa University 1
(Nov. 16, 1995) (transcript on file with Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw).
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was the Declaration of Principles.' It established the overall framework
for negotiations in view of reaching an additional interim and, ultimately, a permanent status agreement. Second, the Israel-Palestine Liberation
Organization Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area 4 provided for the partial withdrawal of Israeli administration and military forces
in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and the assumption of most local
control by the PA. Thereafter, the Agreement on Preparatory Powers
and Responsibilities' allowed for the transfer of authority to the PA in
certain limited spheres such as health, social welfare, direct taxation,
tourism, education, and culture in the parts of the West Bank outside of
the Jericho area. The fourth agreement, the Protocol on Further Transfer
of Powers and Responsibilities,6 provided for the transfer of powers in
the West Bank to the PA in the following civil spheres: labor, industry
and commerce, gas, petroleum, agriculture, local government, statistics,
and postal services.
Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas are'two of the.most important
figures in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and are the subjects of
this review. Both were intimately involved in the secret Oslo negotiations which precipitated the new relationship between Israel and the
PLO. Shimon Peres served as the Israeli Foreign Minister during most
of the peace process. In the aftermath of Itzhak Rabin's assassination, he
assumed the office of prime minister. A man of vision, Peres .has been
involved in Israeli politics for over thirty years and has served in previois governments as prime minister, foreign minister, and minister of
defense. Since the opening of the secret channel at Oslo, Peres has been
the leading advocate of the peace undertaking in the Israeli cabinet. He
was the chief architect of the five interim agreements and, serving now
as prime minister, he continues to play a key role as Israel prepares for
the permanent status negotiations. Peres' book, Battling for Peace: A
Memoir,7 traverses the statesman's seventy-one years and chronicles his
involvement in the key moments of the -history of the state of Israel,
with particular attention being drawn to the current peace undertaking.

3. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993,
Isr.-Palestine Liberation Organization, 32 I.L.M. 1525 [hereinafter DOP].

4. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1995, Isr.-Palestine
Liberation Organization, 33 I.L.M. 622 [hereinafter Cairo Agreement].
5. Agreement on Preparatory Powers and Responsibilities, Aug. 29, 1994, Isr.-Palestine
Liberation Organization, 34 I.L.M. 455.

6. Protocol on Transfer of Powers, Aug. 27, 1995, Isr.-Palestine Liberation Organization
(on file with Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw).
7. SHIMON PERES, BATTLING FOR PEACE: A MEMOIR (1995).
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Mahmoud Abbas (hereinafter Abu Mazen 8), one of the founding
members of the Fatah movement, 9 is a figure of senior stature in the
PLO, second only to its Chairman, Yasser Arafat. He is a member of
both the quasi-parliamentary Palestine National Council (PNC) and the
Executive Committee of the PLO. Considered a moderate and a pragmatist, Abu Mazen was among the representatives of the PLO at the Oslo
negotiations. Following an approximately two year hiatus from the peace
talks, he settled in the West Bank town of Ramallah and was subsequently appointed by Arafat to chair the Central Elections Commission
for the recent Council elections.'" He has reportedly been nominated by
Arafat to act as a representative of the Palestinians at the permanent
status negotiations, which, pursuant to the DOP, will commence in May
1996." Abu Mazen's book Through Secret Channels2 reconstructs
numerous meetings that were held between Israeli and PLO officials
over the years in an effort to initiate a dialogue and negotiate a solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He provides a vivid and detailed
account of the clandestine talks that were conducted in Oslo and which
eventually led to the signing of the DOP on the White House lawn.
While numerous aspects of the Oslo II Agreement and the IsraeliPalestinian peace process as a whole merit examination, this review will
focus mainly on those issues that appear prominently as concerns of
either of the two authors: human rights, the Palestinian elections, Palestinian claims to sovereignty, the amendment of the PLO Covenant, and
the new era and new relationship created between the parties.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PEACE PROCESS
The late Prime Minister Rabin startled many observers when he
stated at the outset of the process that the PLO would be able to enforce
security because it had no need to be concerned about criticism from
human rights organizations. 13 Nor, Rabin continued, would PLO practic-

8. Most of the PLO leadership assumed a nom de guerre, frequently the name of the
eldest son according to the Arab custom.

9. Fatah is the largest faction of the PLO. Headed by Yasser Arafat, Fatah, which
literally translates to mean "victory" or "conquest," is the only major faction within the PLO
which supports the current peace process. See NEIL C. LIVINGSTONE & DAVID HALEVY,
INSIDE THE PLO 72 (1990); DAVID MAKOVSKY, MAKING PEACE WITH THE
GOVERNMENT'S ROAD TO THE OSLO ACCORD 2 (1996).

PLO: THE

RABIN

10. See Abu Mazen Heads Election Commission, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 24, 1995, at 2
[hereinafter Mazen Heads Commission].
11. See Hillel Cohen, Number 2 Talks, KOL HA'IR (Isr.), Jan. 12, 1996, at 52.

12.

MAHMOUD ABBAS, THROUGH SECRET CHANNELS

(1995).

13. See B'tselem, Neither Law Nor Justice: Extra-Judicial Punishment, Abduction,
Unlawful Arrest, and Torture of Palestinian Residents of the West Bank by the Palestinian
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es be subject to judicial review by the Israeli Supreme Court. 4 He said,
"If the Palestinians become a partner to the agreement, they will manage
their internal affairs without a High Court of Justice [and] without
B'tselem [an Israeli human rights organization] . . ."" Unfortunately,
after nearly eighteen months of arbitrary and undemocratic PA rule in
the Palestinian self-governed areas, it appears as if the assassinated head
of state's forecast has proved to be accurate.
One of the significant questions that has arisen as a result of the
parties' decision to opt for an incremental, rather than a comprehensive,
approach in the resolution of their conflict concerns accountability for
human rights violations that occur during the interim period in those
areas where the PA exercises local governmental authority.' 6 The issue
has proved to be crucial, particularly in light of the lack of consideration
for human rights manifested by the PA in the regions of Palestinian
autonomy.
The Oslo II Agreement, 7 like its predecessor, the Cairo Agreement,18 does contain a number of provisions that broadly provide for the
protection of human rights. Thus, Article XIX of the Agreement reads
"Israel and the Council shall exercise their powers and responsibilities
pursuant to this Agreement with due-regard to internationally-accepted
norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law."' 9 Similar
language concerns the parties' conduct in relation to matters of security:
[T]he Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement
with due regard to internationally-accepted norms of human rights
and the rule of law, and shall be guided by the need to protect the
public, respect human dignity and avoid harassment. 20
Preventive Security Service 3 (Aug. 1995) (on file with Michigan Journal of International

Law).

14. Id at 1-2.
15. Id.

16. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Responsibility for the Protection of Human Rights
Under the Interim Israeli-PalestinianAgreements, 28 ISR. L. REV. 297 (1994); Justus R.
Weiner, Human Rights in Limbo During the Interim Period of the Israel-PalestinianPeace
Process: Review, Analysis and Implications, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. (forthcoming
Spring 1996) [hereinafter Human Rights in Limbo]. The PA has 10 separate security forces
and they are enormous relative to the number of residents of the regions under its local rule.
Lisa Beyer, Can a Rebel Be a Ruler?, TIME, July 31, 1995, at 44, 46.
17. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28,
1995, Isr.-Palestine Liberation Organization, available online at URL <http://www.israelmfa.gov.il/peace/interim.html> [hereinafter Oslo II Agreement].
18. Cairo Agreement, supra note 4, art. XIV.
19. Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, art. XIX.
20. Id. Annex I, art. XI, para. 1.
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Beyond these general stipulations, however, the subject of human rights
has received scant treatment in Oslo II. Apparently, safeguarding the
Palestinian inhabitants' human rights throughout the interim period did
not figure among the main priorities of the parties to the protracted
negotiations. Israeli security considerations and matters pertaining to
Palestinian pride and economic viability were the linchpins of the negotiations. Israel negotiated most energetically to institute alternative
arrangements to contain terrorism, understanding that its intelligence
gathering efforts and freedom to preempt attacks or arrest perpetrators
would be severely handicapped as a result of its withdrawal. The PLO's
primary effort was directed at obtaining tangible gains in order to sustain local Palestinian support for the peace process and its Fatah sponsors.

21

Numerous human rights violations perpetrated by PA officials in the
areas for which it obtained authority under the Agreements have been
protested by both local (Palestinian and israeli 22) and international
human rights organizations.23 Unlawful arrests, by the Palestinian police,
of those opposing Arafat 24 and the PA's manner of governing, have
become widespread since the advent of Palestinian autonomy. 25 Brutal

21. See Doug Struck, Deadline Stirring Action on Middle East Peace, BALTIMORE SUN,
May 31, 1995, at 1;see also Beyer, supra note 16, at 44-46.
22. The PA's police and security forces have even arrested Palestinian human rights
activists who have criticized Arafat or his administration. See, e.g., Karsten Prager, Hopeless
in Gaza, TIME, Oct. 9, 1995, at 58. Hanan Ashrawi, while the head of the official Palestinian
Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights, complained, "[t]here is a severe containment of
freedom of expression and freedom of the press." The Fate of Jerusalem - and Peace,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 24, 1995, at 18 (interview with Hanan Ashrawi) [hereinafter
Ashrawi Interview].
23. A study conducted by the U.S.-based Human Rights Watch concluded that human
rights under the PA's local rule were in a "perilous state." Beyer, supra note 16, at 46.
24. During the first 18 months of the PA's control over Gaza and Jericho some 1,500
people, primarily Arafat opponents, were detained, frequently without any formal charges
being brought against them. Prager, supra note 22, at 58.
25.

See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS:

A

YEAR OF SHATTERED HOPES

23-25 (1995) [hereinafter SHATTERED HOPES]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH / MIDDLE EAST, THE
GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO: HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER PALESTINIAN PARTIAL SELF-RULE 16-18

(1995); Jon Immanuel, Outcry Over Abduction of B'tselem Worker by PA Police, JERUSALEM
POST, Jan. 4, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Immanuel, Outcry]; Jon Immanuel, PA Arrests Noted
Civil Rights Activist, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 10, 1995, at 2 [hereinafter Immanuel, Activist
Arrest]; Danny Rubinstein, The PalestinianBag Hurts More, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), May 20, 1995;
Jon Immanuel, Gaza Police Chief Cancels Human Rights Seminar, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 23,
1995, at 2 [hereinafter Immanuel, Gaza Police].
The December 7, 1995 arrest of Dr. Iyad Sarraj, Commissioner General of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen's Rights (PICCR), by agents of the Palestinian Police
Criminal Investigation Department in reaction to certain statements he made about human
rights conditions in the Gaza Strip elicited widespread protest from within the Palestinian
human rights community. Apparently Dr. Sarraj, Hanan Ashrawi's successor as the head of
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torture, sometimes ending in death,26 and prolonged imprisonment
without trial of Palestinians suspected of having "collaborated" with
Israel are direct violations of the Cairo and Oslo II Agreements. 27 Despite this prohibition, illegal detention and torture are routine as the PA
gradually assumes control of Palestinian populated centers.28
The State Security Courts established by Arafat in February 1995 in

Gaza and Jericho utterly fail to meet international standards for a fair

trial.2 9 The judges and prosecutors are all military officers of the PLO3"
directly appointed by Arafat. They base their decisions on the military
legal code that the PLO adopted in Lebanon in 1979. 31 Moreover, Amnesty International asserted that "in the first cases held by the court, pretrial and trial procedures fell far short of international standards for a
fair trial. 32 Prior to trial the defendant is held incommunicado for

krafat's "official" yet "independent" Commission, described the human rights situation under
PA rule as "deteriorating" and asserted that he had not received any responses to the 400
complaints and interventions, sent to the office of the PA's Attorney General, Khaled AlQidreh. The failure of the' Attorney General even to respond to the PA's own human rights
body bodes poorly for its responsiveness to outside organizations and individuals. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine what reasoning could have been behind the decision to arrest
the commissioner general of a human rights organization, especially one with such intimate
ties to the PA authorities. See The Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights,
Press Statement: Palestinian Security Forces Detain PICCR Commissioner General Dr. Iyad
Sarraj for Interrogation (Dec. 8, 1995) (on file with Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw);
Activist Arrest, supra, at 2.
26. See Palestinian Centre for Human Rights & Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Centre for
Human Rights, Joint Statement Regarding Human Rights and Palestinian Elections 3 (Jan. 19,
1996) [hereinafter Palestinian/Kennedy Centres Joint Statement] (on file with Michigan
Journialof InternationalLaw).
27. The Oslo II Agreement clearly forbids harming the so-called collaborators:
Palestinians who have maintained contact with the Israeli authorities will not be
subjected to acts of harassment, violence, retribution or prosecution. Appropriate
ongoing measures will be taken, in coordination with Israel, in order to ensure their
protection.
Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, art. XVI, para. 2; see also Cairo Agreement, supra note 4,
art: XX, para. 4.
28. See B'tselem, Press Release: Tortured to Death at Ketziot 1-2 (Dec. 28, 1995) (on
file with Michigan Journal of International Law); B'tselem, supra note 13, at 1-3; SHATTERED HOPES, supra note 25, at 26-28; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH / MIDDLE EAST, supra note

25, at 22-25. Thirty-one Palestinians suspected of having "collaborated" with Israel have been
killed since the PA assumed authority in Gaza and Jericho. Hundreds more fear for their
security as the Israeli military withdraws from parts of the West Bank. See Eytan Rabin,
Hundreds of Collaborators and Civil Administration Workers Seek Refuge in Israel in Fear of
Their Fate After Withdrawal, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), July 17, 1995, at A3.
29. SHATTERED HOPES, supra note 25, at 22-23; see also Hilary Appleman, Palestinians
See "No Logic, No Law", JERUSALEM POST, May 17, 1995, at 5; Palestinian/Kennedy Centres
Joint Statement, supra note 26, at 5.
30. SHATTERED HOPES, supra note 25, at 22.

31. Prager, supra note 22, at 58.
32. Id. at 58.
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extended periods of time. The trials are usually convened in secret at
midnight. If defense counsel is appointed, and some claim that the
defendant must appear pro se,33 the lawyer is assigned to the case only
immediately before the hearing. Trials are conducted so quickly as to
preclude reasonable procedural guarantees for the defendants. 34 Furthermore, no right of appeal is available to the defendant, except to the PA
or Arafat.
Other important threats to human rights may emerge in the near
future. For example, although there is question whether they have been
enforced, in September 1995 the chief of the Palestinian police issued
two orders: one bans unauthorized political assemblies and the other
forbids bus companies from transporting any political groups or faction
members, regardless of the purpose of their journey, without prior
authorization. 35 These orders, which were apparently aimed at Arafat's
Islamic opposition, may have had a chilling effect on freedom of expression, especially during the election period.36
Also, although it has not been officially invoked, the PA's Press and
Publications Law would place far-reaching restrictions on what can be
published or reported without authorization from the PA's Ministry of
the Media. 37 The law appears to regulate virtually every aspect of what
can and cannot be published 38 as well as who can own a periodical, who
may work as editor-in-chief, and even who can direct a research center
which publishes information. 39 The law also prohibits and controls
relations with foreign bodies and countries and even details how certain
items should be inserted into a publication. Its control mechanism is the
issuance of licenses by the Minister of Information. The methods of

33. Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Election Update No. 2, at 9 (Jan. 12, 1996)
[hereinafter PCHR Election Update] (on file with Michigan Journal of International Law).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 8.

36. See Palestinian/Kennedy Centres Joint Statement, supra note 26, at 4-5. In March
1995, the PA invoked a decree, on political assemblies issued in September 1994, in order to
cancel a human rights seminar on the Security Courts. Id. at 5; see also Gaza Police, supra

note 25, at 2.
37. Palestinian/Kennedy Centres Joint Statement, supra note 26, at 4. Arafat signed this

law on June 25, 1995, as Chairman of the PLO and President of the PA. Palestinian Centre
for Human Rights, Critique of the Press Law 1995 Issued by the Palestinian Authority 4
(1995) [hereinafter PCHR Press Law Critique] (on file with Michigan Journalof International
Law). It has provoked intense criticism from human rights organizations, political parties, and
intellectuals. Id. at 2.
38. Articles 7 and 37 of the law include vaguely-worded prohibitions on the publication
of materials which are "inconsistent with morals" or which "hamper morals, values and
Palestinian traditions" of children and teenagers. Id. at 13, 17. Also unclear is the Article 8
requirement to report in an objective, balanced, and accurate manner. Id. at 14.
39. Id. at 4-5.
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enforcement range from withdrawal of the license to civil or criminal
proceedings brought against any or all of the following persons: (a) the
owner of the publication, (b) its editor-in-chief, (c) the author, (d)
owners of the print and distribution house, and (e) libraries that carry
the offending publication. 4° The penalties under the law include publishing an apology, closure of the publication for three months, a substantial
fine, and even imprisonment for up to six months. 4' A Palestinian
human rights organization expressed its disillusionment with the law as
follows:
The Press Law is an extremely sorry indictment of the period
under Palestinian rule. Its 51 articles seek to control the media,
fundamentally undermining the freedom of expression. At the same
time, it gives the executive sweeping powers and remains silent on
the issues of judicial scrutiny and recourse to the courts when
rights have been infringed. In Gaza, there was great hope that the
onset of autonomy, even in the fragmented and distorted form
envisaged in the Cairo Agreements [sic], would offer a reversal of
the history of occupation and oppression. Unfortunately the Press
Law indicates that the Palestinian Authority has little intention to
respect human rights or to establish the framework for democratic
civil society.42

40. Id. at 5.
41. Id. By comparison, the much criticized Israeli limitations on freedom of the press,
even during the peak of the intifada, were benign. Thus, although the international law of
belligerent occupation gives Israel broad authority to impose censorship, prevent circulation,
and regulate or prohibit entirely all means of communication in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip to prevent incitement, disorder, and hostile activity, in actual practice very little effort
has been made to control the mostly antagonistic Arabic language press. In general, Israel
only censors passages which offer information of military value to enemy states or incite

hatred and disorder, thereby presenting a threat to public order and safety. Violators are very
rarely prosecuted or sanctioned by the removal of their press accreditation. For example,
during the first three years of the intifada, no member of the press had his press credentials
revoked, and only a few brief suspensions were imposed. See Justus R. Weiner, Human
Rights in the Israeli Administered Areas during the Intifada: 1987-1990, 10 WIS. INT'L L.J.

185, 246-51 (1992).
The PA could argue, however, that its Press Law is consistent with the Cairo Agreement, which provides:
Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall seek to foster mutual understanding and

tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other and, without derogating from the principle of freedom of
expression, shall take legal measures to prevent any such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.
Cairo Agreement, supra note 4, art. XII, para. 1. In the author's opinion, however, this
understanding fails to adequately weigh the proviso "without derogating from the freedom of
expression." Nevertheless, the PA should seek to balance this critical human right with the
real danger of incitement against the peace process.
42. PCHR Press Law Critique, supra note 37, at 28.
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Other press restrictions that have already been used include the
intermittent closure of newspaper offices,43 preventing the distribution of
a newspaper, 44 the detention of journalists critical of or insensitive to PA
policy, 45 and the imposition of substantial limits on the allowed content
of published material. 46 These tactics have obstructed the formation of
an open political culture in Palestinian society and fostered an atmo-

sphere of fear among journalists.47
The PA, as a non-sovereign entity, does not have the .capacity to
sign or ratify international human rights conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.48 Israel ratified the treaty,
although with a notable reservation. 49 However, Arafat gave an undertaking on September 30, 1993 that the PA accepted human rights stan-

43. Jon Immanuel, Journalists Blast PA's Restrictions on Press Freedom, 'JERUSALEM
POST, Sept. 29, 1995, at 2. At least ten newspaper premises have been shut down by the PA
since it assumed authority in Gaza and Jericho. See Sami Soukol, The Palestinian Press
Didn't Cover the Elections Out of Fear of PA Police, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 25, 1996, at A2.
44. Peace Watch: PA is Suppressing Freedom of Press, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 17, 1996,
at 2.
45. Arafat has intimidated the press by ar'esting the editor of Al Quds, the leading
Arabic language newspaper which is published in Jerusalem and distributed throughout the
West Bank and Gaza, apparently because the editor relegated a story on Arafat to the inside
pages. See Bill Hutman, Al Quds' Editor Remains in Jericho Jail, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 28,
1995, at 12. On another occasion Arafat ordered a well-known writer arrested. See SHATTERED HOPES, supra note 25, at 24-25; Jon Immanuel, Arafat Frees Jinad Editor for Id alFitr, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 21, 1996, at 2.
46. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH / MIDDLE EAST, supra note 25, at 25-27.
47. Palestinian/Kennedy Centres Joint Statement, supra note 26, at 2, 4.
48. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/RES/6546 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976).
49. Israel ratified the covenant during the summer of 1991. See Becky Cohen, The
Practice of Israel in Matters Related to International Law, 26 ISR. L. REv. 559, 572-73
(1992). The reservation reads as follows:
Since its establishment, the State of Israel has been the victim of continuous threats
and attacks on its very existence as well as on the life and property of its citizens.
These have taken the form of threats of war, of actual armed attacks, and campaigns of terrorism resulting in the murder of and injury to human beings. In view
of the above, the State of Emergency which was proclaimed in May 1948 has
remained in force ever since. This situation constitutes a public emergency within
the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Covenant. The Government of Israel has therefore found it necessary, in accordance with the said Article 4, to take measures to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, for the defence of the
State and for the protection of life and property, including the exercise of powers
of arrest and detention. In so far as any of these measures are inconsistent with
Article 9 of the Covenant, Israel thereby derogates from its obligation under that
provision.
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dards and would ensure their respect in the self-ruled areas. 50 While his
statement has no value as precedent, the Palestinian courts may use it in
interpreting legislation. 5' Moreover, it is possible that the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice will serve as a forum
for human rights complaints arising from the Palestinian self-governed
areas during the interim period.52 Despite the political fallout that would
likely result from such a move, this new jurisdiction could come about
if the Court were challenged to apply its liberal formulation of the
standing and justiciability doctrine to the conduct of PA officials who
have allegedly violated human rights in fulfilling functions delegated to
the PA by Israel. Such an interpretation is possible because Israel remains the state that empowers the PA during the interim period.53
The numerous human rights violations perpetrated by Arafat and the
PA might have been averted had the Agreements been more thoughtfully drafted,54 with greater attention given to the subject of human rights.
It is fairly clear, however, in light of the broader political context, that
neither of the parties has much interest in protecting the human rights of
the Palestinians residing in the self-governed regions. Israel, despite the
language of the Agreements, has yet to voice any public objections
regarding human rights abuses in the areas under PA authority. 55 This
silence is perhaps understandable given that Arafat's remaining in power
is considered essential for the continuation of the peace process and for
the victory of the Labor-led government of Israel in the upcoming national elections.5 6 It is a sad irony, however, that concern for human

50. PCHR Press Law Critique, supra note 37, at 30. Abu Mazen wrote forcefully in his
book that the Palestinian entity "must, before all else, respect human rights' ... and [be]
establish[ed] ... on the bases of modern democratic principles, total freedom[] .... ABBAS,
supra note 12, at 223.
51. PCHR Press Law Critique, supra note 37, at 30.
52. See Human Rights In Limbo, supra note 16.
53. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
54. Hanan Ashrawi, spokesperson of the Palestinian delegation to the Washington peace
talks, was upset when she was shown the DOP. She complained to Arafat, "[h]ow could you
ignore human rights?" Ashrawi Interview, supra note 22, at 18.
55. It could be argued that such protests, would, if made, only aggravate Israeli-PA
relations without achieving anything tangible. Nonetheless, Israel has intervened with practical
steps in order to protect the so-called Palestinian collaborators. Thousands of these individuals
and their families are currently being absorbed into Israeli territory. See Rabin, supra note 28,
at Al; Eytan Rabin, Security Branches Examine Possibility of Assisting Collaborators to
PurchaseHomes in Israel, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), July 17, 1995, at A3.
56. Professor Edward Said, a Palestinian-American Christian who was formerly a
member of the PNC, made the following perspicacious comment:
There is a cynical Israeli policy of letting Arafat become as much a petty dictator
as is consistent with their interests .... [Arafat] governs unilaterally, in the absence
of real laws or constitution. At the urging of Israel and the United States, he has
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rights, which constituted a significant factor prior to the Israeli-Palestinian peace undertaking, is now considered immaterial as the peace process finally reaches fruition.
II. THE PALESTINIAN COUNCIL ELECTIONS
In the same vein, the elections for the Palestinian Council, the
convening of which formed one of the primary purposes of the peace
process,5 8 failed to meet commonly accepted standards for free and
democratic elections. The DOP declared one of the principal aims of the
interim negotiations to be the establishment of a "Palestinian Interim
Self-Government Authority, the elected Council ... for the Palestinian
people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip."59 Article III of the accord
specified that:
[i]n order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles,
direct, free and general political elections will be held for the
Council under agreed supervision and international observation,
while the Palestinian police will ensure public order. 60
The Oslo II Agreement, which sets out the agreed framework for
carrying out the elections, restates the view expressed in the DOP. It
states that
[t]hese elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory
step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements and will provide a6 democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions. '

instituted military courts which can arrest, detain, and sentence people without due
process.
EDWARD SAID, PEACE AND

ITS DISCONTENTS 157 (1995).

57. See, e.g., Amnesty: Human Rights Can't Be Second To Peace, JERUSALEM POST, Feb.
8, 1996, at 2. Hanan Ashrawi proclaimed: "No one cares about Palestinian human rights,
provided they get what they want from the [peace] process." Ashrawi Interview, supra note
22, at 18.
58. Interestingly, during the Oslo negotiations, then-Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon
Peres did not perceive the elections "as necessarily a condition" for the success of the peace
undertaking. He explained himself as follows: "I do not believe democracy can be imposed
artificially on another society, though I do believe the Palestinians could potentiallybecome
the first truly democratic Arab society and that nothing would be a greater boon to Arab life
than true democracy." PERES, supra note 7, at 292-93.
59. DOP, supra note 3, art. I.
60. Id. art. III, para. 1.
61. Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, art. II, para. 2; see also DOP, supra note 3, art.
III, para. 3.

Spring 1996]

An Analysis of the Oslo II Agreement

Indeed, the Oslo II Agreement provides for most of the details concerning the setting of the elections as well as the structure of the Palestinian Council and its Chairman that would emerge therefrom. It is
interesting to note that, although the DOP did not contain any stipulations on the subject, the Oslo II Agreement specifically provided for the
direct election of the Ra'ees62 of the Council. Moreover, following the
Agreement, the elected Council was to be composed of eighty-three
representatives, including the Chairman. Pursuant to Arafat's request,
however, Israel consented to the addition of a number of seats so that
presently the Council comprises eighty-nine members, one fewer than
what it believed was the smallest parliament in the world.63
In accordance with the Oslo II Agreement,' 4 the PA drafted an Elections Law and put it into effect on December 2, 1995.65 Members of
both the PLO and the major opposition parties were given a chance to
voice their opinion regarding the law prior to its adoption.' In addition

62. The use of the Arabic title "Ra'ees" in the Oslo II Agreement in order to designate
the head of the Executive Authority of the Council is the result of a compromise between
Israel and the PLO. Israel rejected the use of the title "President" so as to preclude any
Palestinian claims to the effect that the new entity constituted a state, rather than an exercise
in local self-governance. The PLO, on the other hand, resisted Israeli demands that the term
"Chairman" be used, and insisted that the head of the Executive Authority bear the title of
"President." In the end, the term "Ra'ees" was agreed upon as a suitable compromise since it

may be translated in English as either "Chairman" or "President." See Peace Watch, An
Update on Palestinian Elections: Where Matters Stand on the Eve of the Campaign 8 n.2

(Dec. 27, 1995) [hereinafter Elections Update] (on file with Michigan Journal of International
Law).
63. See Eytan Rabin, Peres Responds Positively to Arafat's Request for Increase in
Number of Council Members, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Dec. 26, 1995, at Al. At first, Palestinian
negotiators demanded that the Council contain 130 members. Israel rejected this claim
outright, proposing instead that the Council be limited in size, with no more than 40 seats.
Israel's main concern in this regard was Palestinian claims to sovereignty. The operation of a
representative body composed of a large number of members in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip could subsequently be equated by the Palestinians to a standard "Parliament," one of the
main attributes of a sovereign entity. Thus, Israel finally accepted that the Council comprise
of 84 seats, including the Ra'ees, based on the conviction that the smallest national parliament
in the world has only 90 seats. Id. This belief was erroneous as a number of mostly small
countries have smaller legislatures, including Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the
Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, Botswana, the United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, and Western
Samoa. THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK 1995-1996, at 76, 83, 85, 162, 188, 196, 211, 1300,

1576, 1598 (Brian Hunter ed., 132d ed. 1995).
64. Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, Annex II, art. I, para. 2.
65. The Palestinian Election Law (Dec. 7, 1995), reprinted and translatedin JERUSALEM
TiMEs, Dec. 15, 1995, at 7 [hereinafter Elections Law].
66. See Elections Update, supra note 62, at 10. A draft Palestinian Political Party Law
was also prepared by the PA's Justice Ministry in view of the elections. The draft law, which
was the subject of intense criticism, was not approved by the PA, and thus was not in force
during the elections. According to one human rights organization, the draft law sought to
regulate every aspect of organized political expression, including the formation and activities
of all political parties. It would have denied registration to parties that oppose the current
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to providing for various significant issues related to the elections, the
Law established a Central Elections Commission that was charged with
overseeing all aspects of the elections.67 In addition, the law instituted an
Elections Appeals Court 68 which served as the final arbiter on matters
pertaining to the elections. The establishment of both of these institu69
tions was mandated by the Oslo II Agreement.
The Elections Law divided 'the West.Bank; Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem into sixteen electoral districts based on the "natural and historical
boundaries" of the region. 70 The law specifically reserved a number of
seats in the Council for Christians and Samaritans residing in the selfgoverned areas. 7' The number of seats allocated per district was established by Yasser Arafat in a decree. 72 Although the Elections Law
specified that "the number of seats in each [should be] proportional to
the population therein, ' 3 many protested that in fact the apportionment
of seats did not reflect the distribution of population between the various
districts, 74 and that the population statistics on which it was based were
never made public. 75 This objection gave rise to charges that the allocation of seats was manipulated for political purposes because Arafat and
76
his faction's base is stronger in some districts than in others.
Nearly seven hundred candidates took part in the Council elections.77 While a majority of the candidates ran as independents, the
7
preponderance of them identified with Arafat and his Fatah faction. 1
Apart from a few fringe movements with individual candidates dispersed

peace process or have radical or revolutionary policies and thereby might have encouraged a
one-party system. See generally PCHR Press Law Critique, supra note 37.
67. See Elections Law, supra note 65, arts. 21-26.
68. See id. arts. 31-37.
69. Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, Annex II, art. I, para. 3.
70. Elections Law, supra note 65, art. 5; see also Elections Update, supra note 62, at
14-15.
71. Elections Law, supra note 65, art. 5, para. 2.
72. See Elections Update, supra note 62, at 14.
73. Elections Law, supra note 65, art. 5.
74. See Peace Watch, Statement # 1 of the Peace Watch Elections Observer Team (Jan.
4, 1996) [hereinafter Peace Watch Statement # 1] (copy on file with Michigan Journal of
International Law); Palestinian/Kennedy Centres Joint Statement, supra note 26, at 6.
75. See Peace Watch, Summary of the Peace Watch Observer Team's Concluding
Statement on the Palestinian Elections Campaign (Jan. 18, 1996) (on file with Michigan
Journal of InternationalLaw).
76. See PCHR Election Update, supra note 33, at 4-7.
77. See Uri Nir, Palestinians Fear Provocation by Jewish Extremists at Council Elections in Jerusalem, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 7, 1996, at A8.
78. See Uri Nir, Discord in Fatah Following Prohibition to Run as Independents,
HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Dec. 29, 1995, at A5.

Spring 19961

An Analysis of the Oslo 11 Agreement

in a limited number of districts, the People's Party, formerly known, as
the Communist Party, was the sole opposition party to conduct an
organized campaign throughout all of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and
East Jerusalem. 79 Consequently, it was not surprising that of the eightyeight contested seats,80 sixty-seven of the successful candidates were
affiliated with Arafat.8 '
The number of candidates opposed .to the peace process was negligible, mainly because the Islamic opposition declined a PA request that
it take- part in the elections and shortly thereafter Hamas and Islamic
Jihad declared a boycott of the democratic exercise. 2 Three former
members of Hamas that had registered their candidacy for the election
withdrew after receiving threats on their lives from Hamas elements in
Jordan.83 In the final analysis, however, the.Islamic opposition's call not
to take. part in the elections was emphatically rejected by the local
population, including Palestinians affiliated with the opposition,8 which
manifested tremendous enthusiasm in participating in the first Palestinian elections-in history. In total, over eighty-five percent of the registered .voters in Gaza and close to seventy percent in the West Bank
exercised their right to vote at the elections.8 5
The direct elections for the office of the Ra'ees were virtually
uncontested.. No credible alternative to PLO Chairman Arafat was
presented to the local populace. Arafat's sole challenger, Samiha Khalil,
the seventy-two year-old head of a charitable institution, did not pose
any threat to Arafat's landslide triumph in the balloting. Khalil won less

79. Danny Rubinstein, The Stamp of Palestinian Legitimacy, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 5,

1996, at B3.
80. There were 52 seats in the West Bank and 36 in the Gaza Strip. Id.
81. See Jon Immanuel, Fatah Wins 67 Seats on Council, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 23, 1996,
at 1 [hereinafter Fatah Wins].
82. See Yossi Torpstein, Palestinian Opposition to Boycott Elections, DAVAR RiSHON,
Jan. 16, 1996, at 3; Jon Immanuel, PA Elections in a Nutshell, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 19,
1996, at 2.
83. Peace Watch, Statement # 3 of the Peace Watch Elections Observer Team 2 (Jan. 11,
1996) [hereinafter Peace Watch Statement # 3] (on file with Michigan Journal of International Law).
84. See Amira Has, Significant Part of Opposition Members - Hamas and the National
and Democratic Fronts - Voted, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 21, 1996, at A5; Uri Nir, 60% of
Hamas Supporters and Almost All Popular Front Supporters Took Part in Elections,
HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 24, 1996, at A4.
85. See Alouf Ben, Peres To Meet Tomorrow With Arafat; Will Demand Liquidation of
Hamas' Base in Territories,HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 23, 1996, at Al; Uri Nit, Sweeping Victory
for Arafat: Controls More Than 60% of the Seats in Council, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 22, 1996,
at Al.
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than ten percent of the total vote.8 6 Prior to the elections it was suggested that Dr. Haidar Abd Al-Shafi, a member of the Palestinian delegation
at the Madrid Peace Conference and vocal opponent of Arafat's peace
diplomacy, might offer his candidacy for the chairmanship of the Council. Al-Shafi chose instead to run for a seat on the Council. He turned
out to be a tremendous success at the ballot box, garnering more votes
than any other Council candidate in the elections.8 7 This achievement is
quite remarkable given that, with the notable exception of human rights
activist Hanan Ashrawi and a few other significant opposition figures,
88
few candidates in disagreement with Arafat won a seat on the Council.
During the negotiations at Oslo, the subject of Jerusalem was a
contentious issue. As Peres wrote, "[t]hroughout the Oslo process, we
were determined not to make any political concessions on Jerusalem."8 9
Abu Mazen, adopting a similar tone, recollected: "Our delegation ...
said that it could not sign any agreement that did not include ...Jerusalem." 9 Consequently, the parties' positions substantially differed on the
extent that Palestinian residents of Jerusalem would be allowed to
participate in the elections. Israel ultimately accepted that Jerusalem
Palestinians could take part in the elections but postponed determining
the extent of their participation in both candidacy and voting for negotiation at a later stage. 91 Hence, the following general stipulation appeared
in Annex I of the DOP: "Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will
have the right to participate in the election process, according to an
agreement between the two sides."'
The issue eventually resurfaced as one of the most contentious
matters during the negotiations of the Oslo II Agreement, placing a
heavy burden on the parties in their peace undertaking.93 After months
of deadlock, the parties finally reached a compromise. 94 The agreement
allowed Palestinian residents of Jerusalem to both vote and present their

86. Amira Has & Uri Nir, Arafat to Be Sworn In Today as President of Council,
HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Feb. 12, 1996, at Al.
87. See Fatah Wins, supra note 81, at 1.
88. See Danny Rubinstein, Abd AI-Shaf! and Ashrawi - Among Figures Elected Despite
Quarrel With Arafat, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 22, 1996, at A3.
89. PERES, supra note 7, at 287.
90. ABBAS, supra note 12, at 134.
91. PERES, supra note 7, at 287.
92. DOR supra note 3, Annex I, art. 1.
93. See John Battersby, A Compromise Propels the Mideast Peace Process, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 15, 1995, at 8.
94. See Joel Singer, The West Bank and Gaza Strip: Phase Two, 7 JUSTICE 1. 5-7

(1995).
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candidacy for a seat on the Council on the condition that they possess a
valid address in the self-governed areas.95 In practice, this limitation
could be sidestepped by simply signing a rental contract in any city
located in an area under PA jurisdiction.96 Moreover, Israel agreed to
authorize the candidates to conduct campaign activities in Jerusalem. 97
This arrangement represented an acceptable compromise. Palestinian
residents of Jerusalem were not deprived of the right to participate in
the Council elections, and Israel's claimed sovereignty over Jerusalem
was not formally violated since it could claim that those who ran for
election did so as absentees based on their residence outside Jerusalem.
As the manager of one of the five Israeli post offices where Palestinians
cast their ballots declared, "[a]s far as we're concerned the [Palestinian]
voters are just sending mail." 8
Nonetheless, various hindrances impeded the elections in Jerusalem.
At the outset, voter registration was exceptionally low due to unfounded
fears that certain Israeli governmental benefits would be denied to those
who cast ballots. 99 On the day of the elections, substantial numbers of
Palestinians were deterred from appearing at the polling stations because
of the heavy presence of Israeli police.1'° Israel had taken stiff security
measures in order to prevent Israelis opposed to the peace process or the
Palestinian Islamic opposition from obstructing the balloting. As a
result, many eligible voters in Jerusalem were reportedly intimidated and
did not vote.' 0 '
Other factors also seriously undermined the democratic nature of the
Palestinian elections. Indeed, it is questionable whether there were
"direct, free and general political elections"'102 as the DOP called for at
the outset of the process. It is therefore debatable whether they were a
"major breakthrough" or a "major step forward" as forecast by Robert

95. The elections arrangements for Jerusalem were set forth in Article VI of Annex II of

the Oslo II Agreement. See Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, Annex II, art. VI.
96. See Elections Update, supra note 62, at 29.
97. Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, Annex II, art. VI, para. 1.
98. See Sami Soukol, Under light Security 30% of Registered Voters in Jerusalem
Voted, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 21, 1996, at A2.
99. See B'tselem, Palestinian Council Elections' Observer: Israel Prevents Free and
Democratic Elections in East Jerusalem (Jan. 18, 1996) (on file with Michigan Journal of
InternationalLaw).

100. See Soukol, supra note 98, at A2.
101. See Derek Brown, Arafat Triumphs but the Voters Signal a Warning, GUARDIAN
(London), Jan. 22, 1996, at 1; Dalia Shahoni, Carter Satisfied With Elections "Apart From
East Jerusalem", HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 22, 1996, at A4.

102. DOP, supra note 3, art. III, para. 1.
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Pelletreau, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Near East
Affairs. 03
The Palestinian Central Election Commission's membership was
dominated by officials with close ties to Arafat's Fatah faction, including notably its President, Abu Mazen. 1' 4 No doubt a panel composed of
impartial individuals would have been preferable. Indeed, Abu Mazen
admitted in an interview prior to the elections that "in principle ... it
was a mistake, The president of the Commission should have been
someone neutral, with no ties to any of the political parties. 10 5
In addition, Chairman Arafat arbitrarily reordered the list of Fatah
candidates for the elections." ° This list had been composed on the basis
of the results of Fatah primaries conducted in certain districts. Arafat,
however, interfered in the democratic process by modifying the lists,
substituting loyalists of his own for candidates not to his liking. Many
07
of the ousted PLO Fatah candidates subsequently ran as independents,'
but the considerable pressure exerted by Fatah members caused others to
withdraw entirely from the elections. 0 8 Other candidates withdrew from
the elections in exchange for jobs in PA ministries."°
These problems were compounded by a considerably shortened
election campaign period of approximately two weeks" 0 due to the tight
schedule to which the Palestinians were confined."' It also undermined
the democratic character of the elections since many candidates were not
given enough time to prepare adequately for the campaign and make
2
their positions known to the voters."
In addition, many international election observers detected a strong
bias in the local press in favor of Arafat and candidates affiliated with

103. Beyer, supra note 16, at 46.
104. See Mazen Heads Commission, supra note 10, at 2.
105. Cohen, supra note 11, at 52, 53 (author's translation); see also Jon Immanuel,
IrregularitiesAre Damaging PA Election Credibility - Chief Observer, JERUSALEM POST,
Jan. 2, 1996, at 2 [hereinafter Immanuel, Irregularities].
106. See Evelyn Gordon, Peace Watch Finds Reason to Doubt Democracy of PA Poll,
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 19, 1996, at 3.
107. See Amira Has, Fatah Prohibits Its Members to Run as Independents, HA'ARETZ
(Isr.), Dec. 28, 1995, at A3.
108. See Peace Watch Statement # 1, supra note 74, at 1.
109. See Peace Watch Statement # 3, supra note 83, at 2.
110. See Peace Watch Statement # 1, supra note 74, at 3-4.
111. The timetable for the 'Palestinian elections was very limited because, on the one
hand, Israeli redeployment from Palestinian populated centers could not be completed before
late December 1995, and on the other hand, the Muslim holy month of Ramadan commenced
in late January. See Elections Update, supra note 62, at 17.
112. See Immanuel, Irregularities, supra note 105, at 1; Palestinian/Kennedy Centres
Joint Statement, supra note 26, at 6.
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his Fatah Party." 3 The election campaign was also marred by the arrest,
detention, and harassment of journalists."4 as well as political and human
rights activists" 5 who expressed opposition to Arafat's policies and
methods of governing. This intimidation was carried out by the Palestinian Preventive Security Service, one of the PA's security agencies.
Moreover, several irregularities on the day of the elections further
tainted the entire exercise. Significant numbers of ballot boxes reportedly disappeared for lengthy periods of time in at least two districts." 6
In certain districts, votes were tabulated without any official supervision, 1 7 and major errors were discovered in the protocols at some
polling stations." 8 Two polling stations in Gaza had to conduct new
balloting due to serious allegations of tampering with the ballot boxes." 9
Appeals subsequently brought before the Palestinian Election Appeals
Court were all dismissed on the pretext that as a matter of principle
claims could not be filed against the Central Elections Commission. 20
This decision by the Appeals Court, aside from being inconsistent with
democratic principles; was also in violation of the Elections Law.'
III. PALESTINIAN CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY
It is clear that one of the main objectives of the elections was to
serve as a "significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of
the legitimate rights of, the Palestinian people,"'2 which are taken to

113. See Immanuel,- Irregularities,supra note 105, at 1;Peace Watch, Peace Watch
Report Reveals Systematic Suppression of Press Freedoms Under the Palestinian Authority
(Jan. 16, 1996) (on file with Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw); Soukol, supra note 43,

at A2.
114. Hillel Kutler, 'We Want Honest Elections,' JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 19, 1996, at 8.

115. See Peace Watch Statement # 3, supra note 83, at I (discussing detention of
People's Party campaign manager and other persons who have spoken out against the PA and

the Fatah movement); Immanuel, Outcry, supra note 25, at 1.
116. See Uri Nir, Tens of Ballot Boxes Abandoned Without Supervision in Ramallah and

Hebron, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 24, 1996, at A4.
117. This violates Article 77 of the Elections Law, which provides that "[viote counting

is conducted in the presence of all members of the Polling Station Commission and those
members of the Electoral Management, representatives of candidates, local and international

observers and journalists who wish to attend the vote count." Elections Law, supra note 65,
art. 77.
118. Id.; Peace Watch, Allegations of Fraud Persist in Gaza, Hebron and Ramallah (Feb.
6, 1996) (on file with Michigan Journal of International Law).
119. See Susan Sappir, Palestinian Poll Seen as Vote for Democracy, Peace, Reuters
World Service, Jan. 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.

120. See Peace Watch, Peace Watch: Appeals Process Inconsistent with Democratic
Principles (Feb. 29, 1996).
121. Id.
122. DOP, supra note 3, art. III, para. 3.
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include the right to self-determination. Although the Agreement does not
contain any specific references to this right under international law, it is
widely accepted that the parties' recognition, initially expressed in the
preamble of the DOP, of "their mutual and legitimate political rights,"
includes the Palestinians' right to self-determination. 23 What is not
clear, however, is whether such a recognition entails Israeli acquiescence
to Palestinian statehood as the inevitable outcome of the peace undertaking.
It should be stressed at the outset that neither the PLO 124 nor the
Palestinian Council meet the prerequisites for independence under
international law. Although the PLO was granted permanent observer
status at the United Nations in 197412' and the PNC proclaimed creation
of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1988,126 at this
stage of the process no sovereign Palestinian entity exists pursuant to
127
prevailing standards of international law.
Even under the Oslo II Agreement, which considerably broadens the
scope of powers transferred to the Palestinian entity, the Palestinian
Council clearly lacks the capacity to conduct foreign relations,'2 8 an
essential prerequisite of sovereignty under international law. 2 9 As Joel
Singer, Legal Advisor of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
senior official to the negotiations with the Palestinians, clarified:
In each one of the three main agreements which Israel has concluded to date with the PLO as part of the current peace process,

123. See generally Antonio Cassese, The Israel-PLO Agreement and Self-Determination,

4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 564 (1993).
124. See James Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?,
1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 307 (1990); Ruth Lapidoth & N.K. Calvo-Goller, Les Elements Constitutifs
de L'Etat et la Declarationdu Conseil National Palestiniendu 15 Novembre 1988, 96 REVUE
GINtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [R.G.D.I.P.] 777 (1992). But see Francis A.
Boyle, The Creation of the State of Palestine, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 301 (1990); Maurice Flory,

Naissance d'un Etat Palestinien,93 R.G.D.I.P. 385 (1989).
125. Observer Status for the Palestinian Liberation Organization,G.A. Res. 3237, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
126. Political Communique and Declaration of Independence by Palestinian National
Council, in THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 344,
348 (Ruth Lapidoth & Moshe Hirsch eds. 1992).
127. See Justus R. Weiner, Hard Facts Meet Soft Law - The Israeli-PLO Declarationof
Principles and the Prospects for Peace: A Response to Katherine W. Meighan, 36 VA. J.
INT'L L. (forthcoming 1996).

128. Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, art. IX, para. 5.
129. According to Ian Brownlie, the ability to enter into relations with other states is
indicative of independence from foreign rule: "the concept of independence is represented by
the requirement of capacity to enter into relations with other states. Independence has been
stressed by many jurists as the decisive criterion of statehood." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 73-74 (4th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
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the issue of foreign relations has received special treatment. This
reflects the fact that ... the treatment of the sphere of foreign
relations has an added effect on the very nature of the autonomous
-entity itself, because full capacity to conduct foreign relations is
one of the accepted indicia of sovereignty and statehood.130
Furthermore, the Oslo II Agreement stipulates that Israel continues to
retain exclusive responsibility for the external security of the West Bank
131
and Gaza Strip.
Moreover, pursuant to the text of the Oslo II Agreement, the Israeli
military government will continue to operate in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip throughout the interim period. In addition, the Agreement contains
several stipulations that the legal status of Gaza, Jericho, and other areas
of the West Bank under the local jurisdiction of the Council remains
unchanged.' 32 It would therefore follow that these regions continue to be
under the occupation of the Israeli military, with the Council acting as
33
nothing more than an agent of the Israeli occupation administration.
Thus, a viable argument exists that the sole source of the Council's
authority and legitimacy is the accords it concluded with Israel. The first
paragraph of Article I of the Oslo II Agreement makes clear that Israel
is the source of the Palestinian Council's administrative power and that
Israel maintains residual control over functions not expressly transferred
to the Council:
Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this
Agreement from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council in accordance with this Agreement.
Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so
transferred. 34
In addition, numerous provisions found in the Agreement stress that the
status of the self-governed areas has not been altered. For instance,
Article XI of the Oslo II Agreement states, "[t]he two sides view the

130. Joel Singer, Aspects of Foreign Relations Under the Israeli-PalestinianAgreements
on Interim Self-Government Arrangementsfor the West Bank and Gaza, 28 ISR. L. REv. 268,

268-69 (1994) (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Even Arafat's senior deputy Abu Mazen,

who was intimately involved in negotiating the DOP, has written, "[w]e do not claim that we
signed an agreement that created an independent Palestinian State; none of the provisions in
the Declaration of Principles make such a claim." ABBAS, supra note 12, at 218.
131. Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, art. X, para. 4.
132. Id. arts. XI, para. 1; art. XXXI, para. 8.
133. See Joel Singer, The Declarationof Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 1 JUSTICE 4, 6 (1994). But see Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 297.
134. Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, art. I, para. 1.
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West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity
and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.', 35 The
Agreement also provides that
After the inauguration of the Council, the [Israeli] Civil Administration in the West Bank will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government shall be withdrawn. The withdrawal of the military government shall not prevent it from exercising
the powers
136
and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.
Thus, the military government continues to exercise certain prerogatives
in those areas for which authority has been transferred to the Council.
The importance of this fact was emphasized by Joel Singer:
In this context, the fact that the military government in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip will continue to exist is very significant. It
emphasizes that, notwithstanding the transfer of a large portion of
the powers and responsibilities currently exercised by Israel to
Palestinian hands, the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip will
not be changed during the interim period. These areas will continue to be subject to military government. Similarly, this fact suggests that the Palestinian Council will not be independent or sovereign in nature, but rather will be legally subordinate to the authority of the military government. In other words, operating within
Israel, the military government will continue to be the source of
authority for the Palestinian Council and the powers and 37responsibilities exercised by it in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.'
Interestingly, according to Shimon Peres, the Palestinians agreed at
Oslo that the military government would constitute the source of authority of the Council:
[T]he Palestinians demanded that the Declaration of Principles
provide (Article VII) that "after the inauguration of the Council,
the Israeli Civil Administration and military government will be
dissolved." We countered that While the civil administration would
be "dissolved" once the autonomy was in place, . .-. the military
government would remain the source of authority in the territories.
The Palestinians agreed, in the end, to that distinction.'38

135. Id. art. XI, para. 1.
136. Id. art. I, para. 5; see also id. art. XVII, para. 4; art. XXXI, para. 7; art. XXXI,
para. 8. The DOP also provided that the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would not be
altered during the interim period. See DOP, supra note 3, art. IV; Annex II, art. 6.
137. Singer, supra note 133, at 6 (emphasis added).
138. PERES, supra note 7, at 290.
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In contrast, Abu Mazen emphatically rejects the claim that the Palestinian Council constitutes nothing more than an agent of the Israeli military
government in specified areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The
following assessment appears in the final chapter of his book, entitled
"Thoughts for the Future":
The allegation that the Palestinian Council will be established
merely to undertake the duties on behalf of Israel is plainly refuted
by many of the articles of the accord [the DOP]. Moreover, the
fact that the priorities of the Interim Authority differ from those of
the Israeli Civil Administration shows conclusively that the Palestinian Council will not merely do Israel's work. Thus the basic
needs of the people will be catered for as a matter of priority
139

The fact that at the current stage of the interim process there is only
a self-governed Palestinian entity in parts of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip does not preclude the eventual creation of a Palestinian state in
these areas. Indeed, many commentators have averred that the creation
of a sovereign Palestinian entity will be inevitable as the process culminates. 14° However, both the United States and the current Israeli leader141
ship have consistently opposed the creation of a Palestinian state,
favoring other models of government for the Palestinian population in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip,, such as a confederation with Jordan. 42
Indeed, Israel's position on this issue was unequivocal throughout the

139. ABBAS, supra note 12, at 219.
140. See Jerry Lewis, Kissinger: PalestinianState "Inevitable," JEWISH CHRON., Oct. 29,
1993; PalestinianElections Will Result In State - Sarid, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 19, 1995, at

1.

141.

Harold Saunders wrote:

The formal U.S. position on Palestinian rights has been not to use the word "selfdetermination" because that word has-been widely misdefined in the Middle East as

meaning "an independent Palestinian state." In early 1985, the Hussein-Arafat
agreement spoke of self-determination in the context of a Jordanian-Palestinian
confederation. The commonly stated U.S. position has been a pragmatic one - that
an act of self-determination can take place in a number of ways and may have a
number of outcomes, not necessarily an independent state.
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS, THE OTHER WALLS 140 (rev. ed. 1991). Israel's opposition is
primarily based on security considerations, i.e., that a Palestinian entity would serve as a base

for terrorism and possibly armed aggression, see CONOR C. O'BRIEN, THE SIEGE: THE SAGA
OF ISRAEL AND ZIONISM 547-48 (1986). This
Jordan. MAKOVSKY, supra note 9, at 124.

aggression could occur against both Israel and

142. In view of the upcoming elections, however, certain elements in the Labor Party
have called for the amendment of those articles in the party's platform rejecting Palestinian
statehood. See Yarayach Tal, Labor Officials: Peres To Support Establishment of Palestinian
State, If Hussein Shows No Opposition, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Feb. 15, 1996, at Al.
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secret negotiations at Oslo, as the following excerpt from Peres' account
of the talks makes clear:
This dispute [concerning the powers and structure of the Council] was linked to several others also stemming from the Palestinians' desire to extend the ambit of self-government so that it would
inexorably lead to full sovereignty, and the Israelis' concern to
limit it so that the permanent status of the territories would not be
prejudiced by the terms of the interim agreement. Thus the Palestinian negotiators pressed repeatedly for the wording "mutual
legitimate, national, and political rights" in the preamble to the
Declaration of Principles. We eventually agreed, reluctantly, to
"political" but refused to accept "national.' It was omitted.'43
Abu Mazen, however, offers a different interpretation of the DOP and
the peace process as a whole, by which he endorses the Palestinians'
claim to sovereignty:
Sovereignty for the Palestinians should not be seen as a textbook
principle of national rights but more as a reflection of a national
existence that was not originally recognized .... [T]he mechanism
by which the terms of the accord will be implemented will eventually give rise to the emergence and crystallization of many features
of sovereignty, and this process will go on until complete sovereignty is realized. In this connection, it is well to remember the
preamble of the Declaration which calls for mutual recognition of
the two parties' "legitimate and political rights" and also Article
III, paragraph 3, which stipulates that the elections of the Palestinian Council "will constitute a significant interim preparatory step
towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people and their just requirements."'"
In the author's opinion the Palestinians are now closer than ever to
achieving their aspiration of statehood. This constitutes an integral part
of the new reality that has been created in the region as a consequence
of the Israeli-Palestinian interim peace efforts.
IV. AMENDING THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COVENANT

The dramatic shift in the geopolitical landscape produced by the
peace process would not have been possible had the Israeli and Palestinian sides not consented at the outset to certain minimal, but indis-

143. PERES, supra note 7, at 289-90.
144. ABBAS, supra note 12, at 219.
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pensable, concessions. Israel insisted that from the beginning of the
process the PLO meet their most basic demands: recognition of Israel's
right to exist in peace and security, acceptance of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338,145 abrogation of the articles of the Palestinian
Covenant calling for the destruction of the state of Israel and cessation
of all acts of violence and terrorism. 146 The Palestinians insisted upon a
formal recognition by Israel of the existence of the Palestinian people
and the PLO as its representative. In the end, after more than ten days
of negotiations, the reciprocal demands were agreed to. Following this
agreement, Israel and the PLO's acquiescence to "mutual recognition"
was communicated by means of Letters of Mutual Recognition exRabin and PLO Chairchanged between the late Israeli Prime Minister
147
DOP.
the
of
signing
the
to
prior
Arafat
man
There can be no doubt that the commitments expressed in the Letters of Mutual Recognition represent major concessions. Until the signing of the DOP, Israel was averse to recognizing the Palestinians as a
group possessing a separate national identity, referring to them solely as
Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 4 8 As for the PLO,
Chairman Arafat, in an effort to enter into a diplomatic dialogue with
the United States, had specifically declared on December 14, 1988 his
organization's acceptance of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 as
a basis for negotiation with Israel together with the PLO's renunciation
of all forms of terrorism. Although the former commitment regarding
Resolutions 242 and 338 was adopted by the PNC in Algiers, as part of
the purported Declaration of Independence and the proclamation of a
state of Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, this quasi-parliamentary body never renounced terrorism. 149 Moreover, during the following eight months, the seriousness of Arafat's commitments was
placed in doubt by numerous attacks carried out across Israel's borders
by PLO elements, particularly those based in Lebanon. The most signifi-

145. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (1967);
S.C. Res. 338, U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., 1747th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/338 (1973). The
Resolutions were adopted by the Security Council in the aftermath of the 1967 and 1973

wars. They call for Israeli withdrawal from "territories occupied in the recent conflict" and
the recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace and security by its Arab neighbors. In
addition, the Resolutions call for a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
146. ABBAS, supra note 12, at 207-08.
147. See Three Letters That Sealed the Diplomatic Bargain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993,

at A12 [hereinafter Three Letters].
148. See Eyal Benvenisti, The Israeli-PalestinianDeclaration of Principles: A Framework for Future Settlement, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 542, 543 (1993); ABBAS, supra note 12, at

207.
149. See

ABBAS,

supra note 12, at 19-35.
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cant of these incursions was a sea-borne raid on the coast near Tel Aviv
which resulted in the United States government suspending the dialogue
it had undertaken with the PLO. 5 ° In addition, the PLO's alliance with
Iraq during the Gulf War provided a further illustration of the organization's reluctance to forsake
its original opposition to the very existence
5
of the state of Israel.1 '
While the preamble of the Oslo II Agreement reaffirms the parties'
"adherence to the mutual recognition and commitments expressed in the
letters ... exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the
Chairman of the PLO,"' 52 this statement cannot be taken at face value
given the PLO's failure to honor one of its fundamental promises 53 as
set forth in the aforementioned Letters of Mutual Recognition which had
been exchanged some two years previously.
Significantly, the PLO has yet to carry out its commitment1 54 to
abrogate the provisions contained in its National Covenant'55 declaring
the establishment of the state of Israel illegal 56 and calling for its
destruction.'
Articles of the Covenant repudiating the Zionist
movement" 8 and justifying armed struggle to liberate Palestine also

150. See Weiner, supra note 41, at 195-96; see also WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, LAW AND
MORALITY IN ISRAEL'S WAR WITH THE PLO 61-64 (1991).
151. See Weiner, supra note 41, at 197.
152. Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, pmbl., para. 7.
153. Withholding recognition was, for both Israelis and Palestinians, a very potent
weapon because it strikes at the other side's most basic human need: assuring its own
identity. SAUNDERS, supra note 141, at 129.
154. See Three Letters, supra note 147, at A12. In his letter, PLO Chairman Arafat
affirms that "those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist ...
are now inoperative and no longer valid ... [and that] the PLO undertakes to submit to the
Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the
PalestinianCovenant." Id. (emphasis added); see also Exchange of Letters accompanying the
Cairo Agreement, in 33 I.L.M. 638 (1994). The Oslo II Agreement states that within two
months of the date of the inauguration of the Council, following the Palestinian elections in
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, the PNC will convene so as to amend the
disputed provisions of the Covenant. Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, art. XXXI, para. 9.
155. See Palestinian Charter of 1964 and Palestinian Charter of 1968, reprinted in 3 THE
ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT 699, 706 (John N. Moore ed., 1974).
156. Palestinian Charter of 1964, supra note 155, arts. 17, 18; Palestinian Charter of
1968, supra note 155, arts. 19, 20.
157. Article 15 of the Covenant (1968) states that it "aims at the elimination of Zionism
in Palestine." Palestinian Charter of 1968, supra note 155, art. 15. Article 21 of this document
states, "[tihe Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves by the armed Palestinian
revolution, reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine." Id.,
art. 21.
158. Palestinian Charter of 1964, supra note 155, art. 19; Palestinian Charter of 1968,
supra note 155, art. 22. The latter provision states, inter alia:
Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in
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remain in force.' 59
The persistence of these provisions more than two years into the
process may be attributed in part to the limited support Arafat's peace
venture has received from major segments of the membership of the
PNC. Given that the abrogation of the aforementioned provisions necessitates approval by a two-thirds majority, 6° it is not surprising that
Arafat has thus far refrained from convening that forum for a vote on
the amendment. Indeed, many members of the Palestinian leadership
adopt the view that no concessions should be made to Israel with regard
to the Covenant before vital Palestinian interests are secured.' 61 Mainstream Palestinian representatives have insisted that Israel fulfill its
obligations under the Oslo II Agreement, such as the creation of a safe
passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the release of
additional prisoners. 62 Opposition figures, on the other hand, have
declared that the Covenant should not be altered before Israel accepts
the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and

the world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist and colonial
in its aims, and fascist in its methods . .
T]he liberation of Palestine will
destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence and will contribute to the establishmerit
of peace in the Middle East. ...
Id. art. 22.
159. Palestinian Charter of 1968, supra note 155, arts. 9, 10, 21. A further contravention
of the terms of the DOP occurred when PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat, in addressing a Johannesburg mosque, called to "begin the jihad to liberate Jerusalem." See P.L.O. Chairman Yassir
Arafat, Speech on Jerusalem to South African Muslims, in Johannesburg,- South Africa (May
10, 1994), in 24 J.PALESTINIAN STUD. 131, 132 (1994); David Makovsky, Rabin: Arafat's
Call for "Jihad" Puts Peace Process in Question, JERUSALEM POST, May 18, 1994, at 1;
Peace Watch, Chairman Arafat's Recent Call for Jihad Constitutes a Violation of the Cairo
Agreement 1-2 (Aug. 10, 1995) (on file with Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw). This
declaration echoed Arafat's statement on Jordanian television the day the DOP was signed
that referred not to peace and coexistence, but rather to the "plan of phases," a euphemism for
the step-by-step destruction of Israel. Yigal Carmon, The Story Behind the Handshake,
COMMENTARY, Mar. 1994, at 25, 29; see also Abraham Tal, What Does the "Ra'ees" Mean?,
HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Aug. 14, 1995, at B1. But see Walid Awad, Jihad of Peaceful Struggle,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 6, 1995, at 7.
160. Palestinian Charter of 1964, supra note 155, art. 29; Palestinian Charter of 1968,
supra note 155, art. 33.
161. Professor Said, a vocal opponent of the peace process, denounced Arafat's promise
to amend the Covenant because it did not demand that Israel reciprocally commit to change
its Law of Return, that grants every Jew automatic Israeli citizenship and which he depicts as
"an extraordinary inequity, intolerable to all Palestinians for almost half a century." SAID,
supra note 56.
162. See Amira Has, Elected Council Member. Covenant - Anachronistic; Must Be
Reciprocality in Fulfilling Agreements, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 29, 1996, at A5; Danny
Rubinstein, Who Cares About the Covenant?, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 29, 1996, at B1; Danny
Rubinstein, Recognition In Return for Recognition, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Feb. 5, 1996, at B1.
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Gaza Strip. 163 Most likely, the PLO negotiating team at Oslo also held a
similar view, and thereby preferred to bequeath the responsibility for
amending the Covenant to the PNC. As Abu Mazen stated in his book:
"[W]e were careful not to offer the Israelis the kind of recognition that
would entail a firm commitment on our part to cancel the relevant
articles in the Covenant because the authority to make such a commitment rested with the PNC."' 64
However, now that the elected Palestinian Council will be presently
inaugurated 65 and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from
Palestinian-populated centers is on the verge of completion, t 6 perhaps
Chairman Arafat will have more success in gathering support to fulfill
this threshold promise. In order to avoid confrontation with those opposed to the peace undertaking, it is expected that a newly drafted
Covenant will be submitted at the next PNC assembly. 67 The PNC is
expected to consider approving the promised changes to the Covenant,
as mandated by the Oslo II Agreement. 61 Indeed, since the elections,
Arafat has taken various measures in order to increase the likelihood of
obtaining the required two-thirds majority at the next PNC session. He
amended the Elections Law so that all newly elected members of the
Council, the vast majority of whom support the peace process, will be
added as members of the PNC. 69 Arafat also secured Israel's consent

163. Amira Has, Abd-AI-Shaf!: Recognition of Our National Rights is a Prerequisitefor
Amending Covenant, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 19, 1996, at A3; Sami Soukol, Ashrawi: Israeli

Pressure to Amend Covenant May Have Reverse Effect, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 23, 1996, at
A4. Following one public opinion poll, close to fifty percent of the Palestinians refused to
amend the Covenant before a Palestinian State is established in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. Only six percent of those surveyed accepted to cancel provisions inconsistent with the
peace process without the promise of Palestinian statehood. See Amend Covenant Only in
Exchange for State: Poll, PALESTINE REP., Feb. 16, 1996, at 13.
164. ABBAS, supra note 12, at 208.
165. Amira Has, Palestinian Council Has First Meeting in Gaza, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Mar.
8, 1996, at Al.
166. Israeli Prime Minister Peres has conditioned the Israeli military's withdrawal from
Hebron upon the PNC amending the Covenant. Arieh O'Sullivan, IDF Clamps Curfew on 465
Villages, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 6, 1996, at 1. According to the impartial Peace Watch
organization, Israel's linking its withdrawal from Hebron to the amendment of the Palestinian
Covenant has no foundation in the Oslo II Agreement. Peace Watch, Legal Opinion: Oslo
Does Not Establish a Link Between Israeli Pullout from Hebron and Amending of Palestinian
Covenant (Mar. 28, 1996).
167. Guy Bechor, Consensus Emerging Within PLO to Draft New Palestinian Covenant
and Not to Amend the Present One, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Feb. 7, 1996, at Al.
168. Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, art. XXXI, para. 9. Pursuant to the Oslo II
Agreement, the changes to the Palestinian Covenant must be approved by May 7, 1996, that
is, within two months of the inauguration of the Council. Id.
169. See Uri Nir, Elected Members of Council to Join PNC, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 18,
1996, at A4.
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for the admission to the self-governed areas of PNC members residing
abroad, so that they may "see for themselves" the benefits emerging
from the peace process. 170 Moreover, the Executive Committee of the
PLO has already met in order to discuss
the proposed amendment and
7
1
assembly.1
PNC
upcoming
the
schedule
The Covenant amendment is particularly significant since it will
serve to demonstrate that, as Israel and the PLO explicitly affirmed in
the preamble of the Oslo II Agreement, "the peace process and the new
era that it has created, as well as the new relationship established between the two Parties ...are irreversible, and the determination of the
two Parties [is] to maintain, sustain and continue the peace process.' 7 2
V. THE NEW ERA

AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS

The signing of the DOP, and the political breakthrough that it
embodied, gave way to momentous changes in the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. It will be recalled that this mutation in the
Arab-Israeli conflict was precipitated by the Gulf War, orchestrated by
the United States to oust the Iraqi occupiers of Kuwait. This campaign
was conducted under the auspices of the United Nations with the support and assistance of a worldwide coalition. In an effort to undermine
the coalition, Saddam Hussein attempted to insinuate a linkage between
the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the Palestinian problem, 73 which
prompted certain governments to call for an international peace conference on the Middle East once the war ended. 174 Although the linkage
established between the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the Iraqi invasion

170. See Alouf Ben et al., Israel Will Allow PNC Members to Enter Territoriesfor Vote
on Amending Covenant, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 21, 1996, at Al. According to Palestinian
sources, virtually all PNC members residing outside the autonomous areas have officially filed
requests to attend the upcoming PNC assembly. See Uri Nir, 167 PNC Members Living
Abroad Officially Request to Come to Autonomous Territories, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Jan. 26,

1996, at A3.
171. See Guy Bechor & Gideon Alon, PLO Executive Committee Discusses Covenant
Amendments in Al-Arish, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Feb. 6, 1996, at Al; Alouf Ben & Uri Nir, Arafat
to Convene PNC in Gaza on April 12 to Discuss Amending Covenant, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Feb.
1, '1996, at Al.

172. Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, pmbl., para. 4.
173. See KAREN A. FESTE, PLANS FOR PEACE: NEGOTIATION AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT 100 (1991); Thomas Friedman, Underneath the Theatrics, First Hint of Concession,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1991, at El.

174. See FESTE, supra note 173, at xvi. France, in the midst of the allied offensive in the
Gulf, insisted that an international peace conference on the Middle East be held once the
fighting ceased. The European Community subsequently gave its endorsement to the claim.
Id.
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of Kuwait was categorically rejected by both the United States and
Israel, 175 Israel ultimately did agree to take part in the postwar peace
talks initiated in Madrid under the auspices of the United States and the
Soviet Union. 176 This forum was a product of United States efforts to
capitalize upon the momentum of the allied victory in the Gulf War in
the hope of brokering peace agreements between Israel, the Palestinians,
and other Arab States.
The Madrid conference stalemated and was largely superseded by
the secret negotiations in Oslo. 177 Far away from the attention of the
media and domestic political pressures, the parties succeeded in devising
a framework for a future settlement of their long-standing dispute.
Engaged in direct negotiations for the first time in the history of their
conflict, 78 various immediate Israeli and PLO interests were served by
concluding the DOP. The then-recently elected Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin had promised the voters that within nine months of
179
taking office an agreement with the Palestinians would be reached.
Peres, his foreign minister at the time, sensed that the collapse of the
Soviet Union, a long-time diplomatic patron and supplier of arms to the
Palestinians and other Arab States, had removed a key obstacle to
reconciliation, giving Israel the upper hand. 80 In the aftermath of the
Gulf War, Arafat was rebuffed in the West and largely isolated in the
Middle East for supporting Saddam Hussein. Moreover, after five years
of intifada, the Chairman of the PLO had nothing tangible to show for

175. Id. at 165; 1 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Dec. 24, 1990, at 1.
176. Doug Struck, A Bleak Day for the Architect of "Greater Israel," BALTIMORE SUN,

Sept. 29, 1995, at 4.
177. See MAKOVSKY, supra note 9, at 38-43.
178. Israel had always refused to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestin-

ians for the purpose of negotiations. Even at the Madrid peace conference, Israel insisted that
no official representatives of the PLO be involved in the multilateral talks. Nonetheless, the
Palestinian delegation maintained close contact and was effectively subordinated to the PLO
throughout the whole process. See PERES, supra note 7, at 274.
179. ROBERT SLATER, RABIN OF ISRAEL 398 (1993).
180. As the then-Foreign Minister recollected:

I believed the world was in the throes of a cataclysmic change. For most of
our century, we had been living according to rules that had evolved from global

confrontations that were now rapidly evaporating. First among these was the
confrontation between East and West .... The East, in effect, had aligned itself
with the Arab cause. Moscow and its allies had provided a steady and reliable

source of military hardware, offering both the military and the political backing that
had enabled the Arabs to make war on Israel. ...
The collapse of the USSR thus signaled far-reaching changes for our region.
The Arabs no longer had a source of arms, generous both with supplies and about

prices and payments, whose support had been grounded in politics and ideology.
PERES, supra note 7, at 275.
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the sacrifices he had urged upon his people. Intrafada (Palestinian on
Palestinian) killings were surging and local support for Hamas and other
Islamic organizations was on the rise, particularly among the Palestinian
youth.
More than two years after the initial breakthrough realized at Oslo,
the dividends Israel and the PLO have enjoyed on the international
plane as a result of their commitment to the peace process are numerous.. Israel and Jordan have negotiated a full and rather warm peace,
bringing tourism, open borders, and the beginnings of economic interdependence."' Israel has much improved diplomatic and trade relations
with numerous European, Islamic, Third World, and even Arab States.' 82
The PLO has established relations with the United States and gained
financial, aid for its efforts to finance its local governmental and economic development functions.18 3 The PLO has also emerged from the
diplomatic seclusion brought on by its backing of Saddam Hussein
during the Gulf War. In addition, the Palestinians, particularly after the
Council elections, have dramatically increased their prospects of achieving statehood, although numerous vexing issues pertaining to the timing,
size, and territorial contiguity of the emerging Palestinian state remain
unresolved as the parties proceed to the final status talks.
Whether the process is indeed irreversible, as the preamble to the
Oslo II Agreement confidently asserts, remains questionable. Upcoming
Israeli elections 184 constitute the next obstacle. The incumbent Labor
Party and its leader Shimon Peres are currently slightly ahead in the
polls, 185 but its increase in popularity is generally attributable to the

181. See Treaty of Peace, Oct. 26, 1994, Isr.-Jordan, 34 I.L.M. 46.
182. See, e.g., Ian Black, Boycott's Stranglehold Loosens, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 26,

1995, at 24; Israel, Oman.Sign Pact to Exchange Trade Reps, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 28,
1996, at 1; Hillel Kutler & Batsheva Tsur, Israel, Tunisia to Announce Formal Ties, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 21, 1996, at 1. :
183. Donor countries recently agreed to transfer close to 1.5 billion dollars to the
Palestinians for the upcoming year. See Raghed Maraya, Donor Countries Grant. PNA
$1.365b, JERUSALEM TIMES, Jan. 12, 1996, at 1.

184. The upcoming elections will witness the first direct balloting.for Prime Minister in
Israel's history. Susan H. Rolef, Direct Elections Won't, End Horse-Trading, JERUSALEM
POST, Feb. 23, 1996,1at 8. Polls taken before the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin indicated that
Likud leader M.K. Binyamin Netanyahu would likely prevail over Rabin. See Uzi Benyamin,
Natanyahu's Links, HA'ARETZ (Ir.), May 21, 1995, at BI; Lisa Beyer, Sick to Death of
Peace; A Majority of Israelis and Palestinians Now Regret Making Their Historic Accord,
TIME, June 5, 1995, at 44, 45; Sarah Honig, Netanyahu Ahead in Latest Poll, JERUSALEM

POST, Apr. 28, 1995, at 3; David Horovitz, The Men Who Would Be King, JERUSALEM REP.,
Mar. 9, 1995, at 12, 13.
185. Poll Shows Peres Losing Ground, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 27, 1996, at 3.
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86
voters' sympathy and outrage resulting from the Rabin assassination.,
The assassin, a twenty-five year-old law student, stated that he
shot the Prime Minister for giving away Jewish land to the enemies of
Israel. 8 7 Apparently in relation to this unprecedented murder, an additional segment of the public lent its support to the implementation of
their late Prime Minister's peace policy. Yitzhak Rabin and his policies
have, following his death, taken on elevated prestige and momentum.
Moreover, the right wing opposition was practically paralyzed-by accusations that its criticisms of Prime Minister Rabin had created the climate in which the assassin committed his crime.'
Whether this constellation of factors will persist until the national
elections, which are scheduled for May 1996,"89 is doubtful. Israeli
support for the peace process, as well as its sponsors, has dimmed 19 as
a result of a string of recent deadly Hamas suicide bombings.' 9' In four
previous national election campaigns the Labor Party led by Shimon
Peres has failed to win an outright victory. 92 His lack of electoral
appeal is augmented by the intense dissatisfaction discerned among large
segments of the polity with both the peace process and its sponsors. 93
Moreover, the popularity of the current government will also be affected

186. Since the assassination in Israel there has been a considerable move away from the
political fringes, especially the right fringe, toward the center. Denunciations of the murder

and of the tiny extremist camp from which the lone assassin, Yigal Amir, emerged have come
from every political party and religious and political leader. Estimates of the number of

persons who came to the Knesset (Israel's parliament) to pay homage to their slain leader ran
between 800,000 and one million, approaching twenty percent of the total population. Even
leaders in the Jewish settlers movement honored the memory of the man who had been their

political nemesis and set in motion diplomatic trends that threaten to undermine their communities and messianic hopes for the return of Jews to their Biblical heartland. They even

remained quiet in the face of a number of terrorist attacks during the weeks after the assassination. See, e.g., All Quiet On Israel's Front, JEWISH TELEGRAPH, Dec. 15, 1995, at 1.
187. Derek Brown, Secret Service Feels Rabin Fall-Out, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 19,

1995, at 3.
188. The right, which had been ascendant, suspended its frequent demonstrations and
campaign of civil disobedience during the month of mourning, this despite the withdrawal of
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by any understanding it reaches in the peace negotiations with Syria.
Surely, any agreement concluded before the elections including significant territorial concessions on the Golan Heights would be greeted with
widespread opposition among the Israeli public, 94 further limiting the
government's leeway in negotiating with the Palestinians.
A victory by the opposition Likud party would definitely have a
negative impact on the peace process. Although most of its members do
not advocate returning to either Gaza or the Palestinian populated centers recently evacuated in the West Bank,' 95 the Likud's leader,
Binyamin Netanyahu, has declared that when his party comes to power
he will not meet with Yasser Arafat. 96 Former Likud Prime Minister
Yitzhak Shamir stated that when his party returns to power it will stop
the agreements set in motion by his successor, Yitzhak Rabin. Shamir
explained:
Nothing is irreversible. Maybe it's difficult to change something.
But I don't know any government existing in the world arena that
conducts a policy that is against its (people's) conscience and
views...,. Maybe it will take time [but the changes made by
Rabin are] not a fact that has to stay for 100 years. 97
Thus, further territorial concessions to the Palestinians would likely be
resisted 98 and the final status negotiations would probably become deadlocked or simply fall apart. Hence, Palestinian fears that the Oslo II
Agreement will de facto represent the permanent status agreement may
eventually crystallize.' 99
Even in the event of a Labor-Peres victory at the polls, the successful conclusion of the peace process is far from assured. The permanent status negotiations, set to begin on May 4, 1996 according to the
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timetable established in the DOP,2 concern a number of key issues
where profound differences divide the parties. These essential yet intractable issues include the sovereignty of Jerusalem, the future of Jewish
settlements, control of subterranean water resources, the issue of Palestinian statehood, and the repatriation or resettlement of Palestinian
refugees from the 1967 and 1948 wars. Given the differences between
the two sides, it is not implausible that once the negotiations commence
they will become deadlocked, risking implosion of the entire process.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

Shimon Peres opens the epilogue of his book with the following
credo: "I was born an optimist and have remained one throughout my
life. Pessimism has always seemed to me a useless frame of mind." 2 '
He then conveys his outlook regarding the future of the Middle East:
We are ending a decades-long history dominated by war and embarking on an era in which the guns will stay silent while dreams
flourish. I feel I have earned the right to dream. So much that I
dreamed in the past was dismissed as fantasy but has now become
thriving reality. Peace in our region is no longer part of a
dreamworld;
it has built a permanent place for itself in the realm of
20 2
reality.
Abu Mazen begins the final chapter of his book with reference to the
Palestinians' decades-long struggle for recognition:
The long struggle of the Palestinian people was aimed at regaining
their dignity, their rights and their place among the peoples of the
world in an independent state. This struggle was a genuine expression of their. refusal to submit to the "reality" which had been
imposed upon them. It was not vengeance but an expression of
their collective will that drove them on. Though many were dispersed, they kept Up the struggle under the leadership of the PLO.
The intifada in the occupied territories was a natural extension of
this struggle, and showed that the Palestinian people were a match
for the Israelis who contested their existence and strove to crush
them. But
they were persuaded otherwise when the decisive hour
3
came.

20

200. See DOP, supra note 3, art. V; Cairo Agreement, supra note 4, art. XXIII, para. 3;
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The Oslo II Agreement reflects a milestone in the new relationship
that has begun to take form between Israel and the Palestinians. Its
implementation, which is far from being completed, is of great significance for the Palestinians as they advance toward expanded self-government. The recent election and inauguration of the Council, together
with the withdrawal of Israeli troops from nearly all Palestinian populated centers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, have enhanced the morale of the Palestinians and given them a strong sense of achievement.
Unlike its main predecessor, the Cairo Agreement, which was depicted
as "reduc[ing] the National Authority [PA] to the status of a municipality in virtual receivership," 2' the Oslo II Agreement provides, to a
large extent, for the' creation of autonomous. Palestinian democratic
institutions.
Pursuant to the Agreement, the Council is to be composed of a
legislative and an executive branch. After its inauguration, it will adopt
a "Basic Law for the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority,"2 5
a quasi-constitution, which shall provide in detail for the organization,
structure, and functioning of the Council during the interim period.
The provisions found in the Oslo II Agreement concerning the
formation of the Council reflect the parties' unequivocal commitment to
the establishment of a democratic system of government in the autonomous areas. The organization of the Council takes into consideration
separation of powers concerns. The allocation of authority between the
executive and the legislature seeks to embody a mechanism of checks
and balances. Moreover, the Agreement calls for the establishment of
"an independent judicial system composed of independent Palestinian
courts and tribunals" 2°6 which shall include a Palestinian Court of Justice
entrusted with powers of judicial review.20 7
Thus, Abu Mazen's wish that the new Palestinian entity be based on
"modern democratic principles" 2°8 appears to have been realized. But as
has been noted with alarm in this review, the reality on the ground has
not lived up to the precepts set forth in the Agreements. Whether the
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205. Oslo II Agreement, supra note 17, art. III, para. 7. The Basic Law is currently in its
fourth draft form and is scheduled to be adopted shortly by the Palestinian Council after its
inauguration. See Ragheb Maraya, PNA Gets a Constitution, JERUSALEM TIMES, Feb. 9, 1996,
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emerging Palestinian entity will be truly democratic in essence will
depend on a number of factors. Most importantly, as Abu Mazen himself observed, the Palestinians will have to "move from the mentality of
revolution" 2°gand cease sacrificing basic tenets of democratic life for
what their leaders define as the "national good." Indeed, Palestinians
have always focused on collective conceptions of human rights that are
closely interrelated with the principle of self-determination and independence from Israeli occupation. But now that the Council has substantially replaced Israel as the immediate level of governing authority, a new
emphasis will have to be placed on individual rights, in derogation of
the policies of Yasser Arafat and his administration, within the Palestin210
ian polity.
Moreover, recent developments have strengthened the prospect that
a Palestinian state will emerge out of the current peace undertaking.
Opposition to Palestinian statehood is slowly fading within the ranks of
Israel's Labor Party.2 ' A recently disclosed document, negotiated between Abu Mazen and Israeli cabinet member Yossi Beilin, outlines the
main points of a tentative permanent status agreement and provides for
the creation of a Palestinian state.2 12 Although the tentative agreement
was allegedly rejected by then-Foreign Minister Peres, it indubitably
reflects a significant shift among Israel's political leadership regarding
the eventuality of Palestinian sovereignty over the bulk of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip.213
The prospects for the realization of Shimon Peres' vision of peace
and prosperity in the Middle East, although dramatically improved in
the aftermath of the Rabin assassination, appear less assured in light of
more recent events. The resumption of suicide bombings by Hamas
against Israeli civilian targets 214 has dramatically undermined Israeli trust
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in Arafat's capacity and willingness to combat terrorist elements under
the PA's jurisdiction. 21 5 The perpetration of these fatal attacks during the
run-up to the Israeli national elections will certainly weaken the Labor
Party and Prime Minister Peres' prospects for re-election 2' 6 and thus
endanger the continuance of the peace process. Sensitive to the electoral
realities, the day after two such attacks Peres rededicated Israel to both
fighting terror and pursuing peace. 2 7 He accused Hamas of undermining
the Palestinians' desire for peace and prosperity218 and challenged the
PA to confiscate the weapons of Hamas and other paramilitary organizations as is required by the interim agreements.2 9
After Peres' speech to the Knesset plenum a member of the Likud
opposition party heckled the Prime Minister. The sarcastic taunt was,
"[t]his is the new Middle East[?]" 220 At the same Knesset session the
leader of the parliamentary opposition stated:
Shimon, fight them with all your strength and all your might and
we'll support you. We are united. There is no peace and no calm.
Israel should strive for peace while recognizing this reality. It
cannot count on the Palestinian Army, only on the IDF. The security forces should have freedom of action. Peace can only be
achieved when there is security.22'
Within thirty-six hours of the bombings the Palestinian police had
arrested nearly 100 Hamas activists, and the Gaza police commander
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said that his forces would implement, "intensive new steps" against the
planners of violence.222 The effectiveness of these arrests and the
planned steps remains questionable in light of the dedication of Hamas.
Persons picked up in previous waves of arrests have generally been
released after the political storm has passed.223 Palestine Radio condemned the bombings but the Palestinian Authority Information Ministry
stated that, "the Israeli side carries responsibility for creating an atmosphere conducive to acts like these." 24 Arafat insisted, however, that a
shadowy organization of ex-IDF personnel determined to sabotage the
peace process had furnished the explosives used in the attacks.225 When
asked about Arafat's claim the Israeli
Foreign Minister Ehud Barak
226
responded that it was "nonsense.,
The Israeli-Palestinian peace process has thus far shown remarkable
stamina. Yet it remains fragile and must, as recent events have forcefully underscored, function in the shadow of the political vicissitudes of the
Middle East.227 Whether the vision of Peres, the moderation of Abu
228
Mazen, or the democratic structures of the painstakingly negotiated
Oslo II Agreement will prevail in this environment remains too enigmatic to predict.
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